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Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management,
and Trusted Systems
Jonathan Weinberg*
Technologies involving the assignment and use of common user identifiers,
such as Intel's ill-fated Processor Serial Number, provide a straighforward
way for publishers to verify the authenticity of messages claiming authorization
to receive digital works. These technologies are a useful adjunct to trusted
systems, which allow content providers to prevent recipients from passing us-
able copies of the work to anyone who has not paid the content provider, and
give content providers flexibility in specifying the nature of the event that will
trigger a payment obligation. But their consequences are undesirable: Trusted
systems relying on common identifiers will reduce anonymity and informational
privacy on the Internet. They raise the prospect that a much larger proportion
of ordinary transactions will require consumers to present unique identification
numbers digitally linked to a wide range ofpersonally identifiable information.
They are well-suited to being used across the board by a large number of un-
related information collectors, increasing the ease with which a wide range of
information about a person can be aggregated into a single overall dossier.
Moreover, the combination of trusted-systems technology (allowing pub-
lishers to ensure that speech released to Bob does not make its way, via sharing
or secondary markets, to Alice) and the privacy effects described above (al-
lowing publishers to collect extensive individualized information on consumers)
will sharply enhance producers' ability to discriminate among individual con-
sumers in connection with the sale and marketing of information goods. Some
commentators suggest that this concentration of control is a good thing; the
price discrimination it enables, they urge, will broaden distribution of informa-
tion goods. Yet the benefits of such a system are clouded; any increase in dis-
tribution due to price discrimination comes at the cost of shutting down
distribution that comes, in today's less-controlled system, through sharing or
secondary markets. It will likely be accompanied by increased media concen-
tration and a self-reinforcing cycle of commercial pressure on individual pri-
vacy. In considering these effects, we should remember that they are
unnecessary; publishers could get the benefits of trusted systems without rely-
ing on common identifiers at all.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I owe thanks to Phil Agre, Karl Auerbach, Lor-
rie Cranor, Jessica Litman, Neil Netanel, Paul Resnick, and Joel Reidenberg. Earlier versions of
this paper were presented at a Haifa University Conference on the Commodification of Information
and at the Teleconmnunications Policy Research Conference. All Internet citations were current as
of May22,2000. Copyright© 2000 by Jonathan Weinberg and the Board ofTrustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University.
1251
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
I. RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND TRUSTED SYSTEMS ......................................... 1255
I. ANONYMITY AND IDENTIFIABILITY ON THE INTERNET ................................. 1259
III. INTEL AND THE PROCESSOR SERIAL NUMBER .............................................. 1263
IV. TRUSTED SYSTEMS AND COMMON IDENTIFIERS .......................................... 1268
A . Introduction ......................................................................................... 1268
B. Privacy ................................................................................................. 1269
C. Communications Policy ....................................................................... 1271
V. IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS ............................................................ 1279
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 1280
Networked digital technology enables the easy and inexpensive move-
ment of speech and information among persons who are strangers to one an-
other. People may not always find unfettered movement desirable, though.
A content producer may want to disseminate information to some recipients,
such as those who have paid, but not others. A parent may wish that the
computers in her home not display certain sexually explicit content offered
by a willing speaker. A government might wish that certain speech be avail-
able to some recipients but not others, for example, that gambling solicita-
tions be inaccessible in specific geographic jurisdictions.
In order to determine whether particular content should be disseminated
to a particular recipient, the decisionmaker must have information about both
the content and the recipient. To block content requiring payment to persons
who have not paid, one needs to know both whether the requested document
requires payment and whether the requester has paid; to block sexually ex-
plicit content to minors whose parents wish to shield them from such mate-
rial, one needs to know both whether the particular document contains
proscribed content and whether the requester is such a minor; to block gam-
bling solicitations to persons in certain geographic jurisdictions, one needs to
know both whether the particular document is a gambling solicitation and the
geographic location of the requester. As Larry Lessig and Paul Resnick
point out, this can present a difficulty: No one actor, at the outset, may pos-
sess all of that information.'
Various techniques are available to overcome that difficulty. One ap-
proach is filtering. A parent concerned about her child's access to sexually
explicit speech knows something about her child's characteristics, but little
about the contents of each of the Web sites her child might visit. Filtering
systems attempt to solve that problem by generating information about those
1. See generally Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal
and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1999). Lessig and Resnick present a model including
three categories of information: the content of the speech, the characteristics of the recipient, and
the jurisdiction of the recipient (which they assume determines the law describing whether it is
permissible to send speech with that content to a recipient with those characteristics).
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Web sites, so that the parent, armed with both the characteristics of the
speech and those of her child, can make blocking decisions based on her own
policy preferences. However, the filtering enterprise turns out to be prob-
lematic in several respects. One problem lies in the difficulty of collecting
accurate and nuanced information about myriad Internet speech resources;
another lies in the difficulty of vindicating users' individual policy prefer-
ences via off-the-shelf software. Entry barriers and informational costs mean
that only a few firms can manage to tag huge numbers of Web resources;
consumers, in turn, do not know and have difficulty evaluating the evaluat-
ors' substantive criteria.2 As a result, although filtering in theory diffuses
power among hosts of information recipients, to some extent it concentrates
power in the third-party ratings providers.3
Filtering, though, is not the only possible response to this sort of diffi-
culty. Another approach, as Lessig and Resnick point out, is to set up Inter-
net architecture to require the would-be recipient of speech to transmit
information about her characteristics back to the content provider, so that the
provider can then make content dissemination choices according to its policy
preferences or binding legal .rules.4 Increasingly, firms interested in com-
merce in information goods are designing structures to enable that process.
This paper examines the implications of different choices for managing
the information flow from consumers to content providers. In particular, it
focuses on the implications of an Internet architecture that identifies each
consumer by a single unique identifier that can be tied to the consumer's
real-world identity and that is available to a wide range of applications and
content providers. Such a system can be implemented through hardware-
based identification like Intel's Processor Serial Number (PSN). It allows
the content provider easily to identify the consumer originating any given
packet stream and to correlate incoming payment and other information to
the outgoing information and entertainment that the content provider releases
to that consumer: All of the data is simply filed under the consumer's unique
ID. That architecture stands in contrast to one in which content providers
use more sophisticated cryptographic techniques to assign consumers identi-
2. Because filtering software companies protect their evaluation processes and algorithms as
trade secrets, consumers only have access to the descriptions of the guidelines in the companies'
promotional materials. These have often proved inaccurate. For example, companies' claims that a
human employee reviews each blocked site are routinely belied by an examination of the sites that
end up being blocked. See, e.g., MICHAEL SIMS, BENNETrHASELToN, JAMIE MCCARTHY, JAMES
S. TYRE, JONATHAN WALLACE, DAVID SMITH & GABRIEL WACHOB, THE CENSORWARE PROJECT,
CENSORED INTERNET ACCESS IN UTAH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES 10 (1999) <http://www.
censorware.org/reports/utah> (noting that although Secure Computing states that "[als a rule, sites
are not [blocked] without first being viewed and approved by our staff," its filtering product blocks
in its "Drugs" category the Iowa State Division of Narcotics Enforcement Web page).
3. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & EN. L.J 453
(1997) (discussing filtering technology's limitations and drawbacks).
4. See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 1, at 406-09,416-17.
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fiers that cannot be linked to their real-world identities or their activities in
other contexts. Those techniques would protect consumers' choices from
disclosure and would preclude the assembly of dossiers on particular indi-
viduals.
Technologies involving the assignment of user or platform identifiers,
enforced through hardware-based user identification such as the PSN, can
give providers of information goods extensive new capabilities. Such tech-
nologies provide an easy and straightforward way for publishers to verify the
authenticity of messages claiming authorization to receive digital works,
giving them greater ability to limit availability of their works to folks who
meet certain criteria. The technology dovetails with the use of trusted sys-
tems, allowing content providers to prevent recipients from passing usable
copies of the work to anyone who has not paid the content provider, and
giving content providers flexibility in specifying the nature of the event that
will trigger a payment obligation.
These technologies, though, have other consequences as well. The most
obvious relate to privacy: Trusted systems relying on transparent unique
identifiers, and in particular systems built around the PSN, threaten to
sharply diminish anonymity and informational privacy on the Internet. They
raise the prospect that a much larger proportion of ordinary transactions will
require consumers to present unique identification numbers digitally linked
to a wide range of personally identifiable information. They are well-suited
to across-the-board use by a large number of unrelated information collec-
tors, increasing the ease with which a wide range of information about a per-
son can be aggregated into a single overall dossier.
Moreover, the combination of trusted-systems technology that enables
publishers to ensure that speech released to one consumer does not make its
way via sharing or secondary markets to another, and the privacy effects of
allowing publishers to collect extensive individualized information on con-
sumers, will likely affect the economics and politics of speech markets. It
will sharply enhance producers' ability to discriminate among individual
consumers, on price and other grounds, in connection with the sale and mar-
keting of information goods. Some commentators suggest that this concen-
tration of control is a good thing because the price discrimination it enables
will broaden distribution of information goods.S Yet the benefits of such a
system are clouded; any increase in distribution due to price discrimination
comes at the cost of shutting down the distribution that comes, in today's
less-controlled system, through sharing or secondary markets. It will likely
5. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 1203, 1239 (1998) (arguing that concentration of control and the price discrimination it en-
ables are desirable because they will broaden the distribution of goods).
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be accompanied by increased media concentration and a self-reinforcing cy-
cle of commercial pressure on individual privacy.
Publishers can get the benefits of trusted systems without these socially
undesirable consequences by relying on identification techniques that assure
consumers a greater degree of privacy. Building trusted systems around
hardware-based consumer identifiers therefore not only carries with it a
dystopian future of universal personal monitoring and identification, but also
is unnecessary to meet publishers' legitimate needs.
In Part I of this paper, I explore the market incentives for the widespread
deployment of systems under which information flows from consumers to
content providers. In Part II, I discuss the blend of anonymity and identifi-
ability presented by current Internet architecture, and in Part III, I focus on a
particular technology-the Processor Serial Number built into the Intel chips
powering most computing devices today. In Part IV, I discuss the implica-
tions of such technology for privacy and the economics and politics of com-
munications markets. Unique identifiers, and their associated technology,
promise to give content providers vastly expanded powers to discriminate
among consumers by setting prices on an individual basis and by picking and
choosing who will be allowed to view or read particular works. Although
some argue that these would be positive developments, I submit that they
are, on balance, unfortunate. In Part V, I note that the negative consequences
of this technology are avoidable: Content providers could rely on more so-
phisticated cryptographic techniques to manage access to their information
goods. Such systems would allow content owners to exploit their intellectual
property, but would avoid the consequences described in this paper.
I. RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND TRUSTED SYSTEMS
The most important concern driving the information flow from consum-
ers to content providers relates to rights management. The term "rights man-
agement" is commonly associated with the protection of intellectual property
rights, but it need not be so limited. One can think of rights management as
covering any technological means of controlling public access to, and ma-
nipulation of, digital resources. That sort of control is basic to any system of
networked computing. At the heart of Unix, for example, is the concept of
permissions, that define which users on a network can take what actions
(read, write, execute) on which files and directories.6 Networking would not
be very practical without a way of defining and limiting the set of people
who can have access to particular documents and other network resources.
6. See JOHN R. LEVINE & MARGARET LEVINE YOUNG, UNIX FOR DUMMIis 313-18 (1993);
MATT WEESH & LARKAUFMAN, RUNNING LiNUX 104-09 (2d ed. 1996).
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Rights management techniques, in that sense, are simply a form of network
security.
Those techniques demand a reliable way to match usernames with real-
world individuals. After all, it is the individual, not the usemame, whose
access to files is at issue. In the old days, when mainframe computers ruled
the world, system administrators had little difficulty associating the individu-
als using their systems with unique usernames, and thus using permissions or
similar file access rights to enforce that aspect of system security. The sys-
tems administrators themselves had assigned those usernames to the indi-
viduals in question.7 The situation was not much different for a self-
contained local area network.
But the Internet changed things: It has no system administrator. There is
no reliable automated way, under current technology, to tell which individual
is associated with any given username on an Internet-connected network.8
Indeed, even your own computer does not know who you are; if you tell your
PC that you are Napoleon or loan of Arc, it has no reason to disbelieve you.9
For this reason, the ordinary Internet architecture stymies attempts at rights
management beyond a given network. It provides no convenient set of op-
tions in the middle ground between blocking access by anyone outside one's
own network and granting access to everyone in the world.
How can one extend sophisticated file access rights beyond the con-
trolled network environment into the Internet universe at large? Put another
way, how can a local server extend secure control over the many intercon-
nected networks that make up the Internet? To do that, it must be able to
reliably identify everybody out there seeking access to its files, or at least,
everybody to whom it is willing to grant access, and then be able to sort
those persons by whichever of their characteristics it deems relevant. That is
to say, it must have some way of reliably associating incoming packet
streams with identified real-world individuals, and it must have-or be able
to collect-enough information about each of those individuals to implement
a set of rules determining whether to grant access.10
7. See Philip E. Agre, The Architecture of Identity: Embedding Privacy in Market Institu-
tions, 2 INFO., COMM. AND SOC'Y 1, 25 (Spring 1999) <http:llwww.infosoc.co.ulOO105/
feature.htm>.
8. See generally S. Bradner, Source Directed Access Control on the Internet (Nov. 1996)
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notesrfc2O57.txt> (Network Working Group RFC 2057) (stating that no one
has control and oversight over the Internet, and that there is no central database of computer ad-
dresses and user identities). While Unix systems may supply such information in response to the
"finger" command, there is nothing in the Internet architecture that requires them to do so, or to do
so accurately. See ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNaET USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG 171-74 (1992)
(explaining finger queries).
9. See Agre, supra note 7, at 11.
10. This criterion is oversimplified, as Part V of the paper demonstrates, but it will do for
now.
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One way for a content provider to accomplish these tasks is to allow ac-
cess only if the recipient's computer (or other device) incorporates hardware
and software meeting security specifications, approved by the content pro-
vider, enforcing rules under which individuals can access and use particular
digital content. In such a case, technologists refer to the server and recipient
as being part of a "trusted system."" The server can rely on "trusted" ele-
ments of the recipients' device to identify the recipient, to transmit only ac-
curate information about the recipient, and to limit the recipient's ability to
manipulate any content it receives from the server in ways that exceed its
authorization.
Trusted systems enable the sophisticated network security I discussed
above, because they give the content provider a way to verify the authenticity
of any message it receives that claims authorization to read a digital work.
But their implications are broader. They allow the content provider to make
the works available only to persons the content provider knows have paid for
access. They allow the content provider to prevent the recipient from pass-
ing usable copies of the works to unauthorized persons. And they allow the
content provider great flexibility in specifying the nature of the event that
will trigger a payment obligation. For example, a content provider could
allow a consumer to download a work for free, but require payment each
time she reads or listens to it. In short, trusted systems have the capability to
be an extraordinarily effective and profitable means of controlling, and ra-
tioning, access to works of information and entertainment.12
If trusted systems could be extended to the ordinary home computer,
they would provide content owners with an important tool in the economic
exploitation of their works. This would not be entirely straightforward,
though. First, there is the issue of market acceptance: If the home PC is to
take its place as part of a trusted system, then it will have to include hard-
ware and/or software that disables, to some extent, the PC's ability to interact
anonymously with other machines and to manipulate data stored on its own
11. See Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AMER., Mar. 1997, at 78 <http://www.sciam.com/
0397issue/0397stefik.html>; see also XEROX CORP., THE DIGITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS LANGUAGE:
MANUAL AND TUTORIAL - XML EDITION 5 (ver. 2.00 1998) (A trusted system is a system that
can hold digital works and which can be trusted to honor the rights, conditions, and fees specified
for a work.").
12. See generally XEROX CORP., supra note 11 (describing the use of trusted systems to con-
trol access to, transfer of, and usage of digital works); Mark Gimbel, Some Thoughts on the impli-
cations of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Lzaw, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1671 (1998) (arguing
that trusted systems enable an unprecedented degree of control over protected works). Xerox's
ContentGuard is an example of sophisticated trusted-system technology. ContentGuard uses Java
applets to control Self Protecting Documents (SPD), which are sent to particular users customized
according to the user's credentials, the rights purchased for a given document, and the environment
in which the document is to be viewed or printed. The SPD interacts with a back-office server to
allow only authorized viewing or printing. See ContentGuard, Self-Protecting Document-'
<www.contentguard.corifoverview/techspd.htn>; Aran Rarnanujapuram & Prasad Ram, Digital
Content & Intellectual Property Rights, DR. DOBB'S J., Dec. 1998, at 20-26 (Dec. 1998).
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hard disk. As Mark Stefik puts it: "What's in all this for consumers? Why
should they welcome an arrangement in which they have less than absolute
control over the equipment and data in their possession?" 3 Stefik, a propo-
nent of trusted systems, answers that participation in trusted systems will
benefit consumers in the long run because content providers will make desir-
able digital content available over the Internet only if trusted systems are
available to them.14
This is contested ground. Although major record labels and Hollywood
studios have worked hard to ensure that their products are available over the
Internet only in secured form,15 the music industry, at least, appears to have
reconciled itself to the fact that music is increasingly available over the Net
in other formats.16 It seems plausible that the industry might reconcile itself
to releasing its own product in a less-than-secure format if it believed that, on
balance, there was money to be made that way. Even absent the legal and
technological protections sought by content owners, the Web now provides
both extensive professionally created and formatted commercial content, and
extensive valuable content that is not professionally formatted and created.17
And the trend, even absent such protections, has been towards making more
and more content available. But the proponents of trusted systems, at least,
argue that the most commercially valuable content will not become available
without robust technological (and backup legal) protections.
Next, there is the issue of technological feasibility. In order to imple-
ment large-scale trusted systems, the computer industry must develop tech-
nology well-suited to feeding reliable identifying information about
consumers' home PCs back to content providers. Such technology is hardly
13. Stefik, supra note 11, at 81.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Beth Lipton Krigel, Music Industry Blames MP3 for Sagging Sales, CNET
N-WS.COM (Mar. 25, 1999) <http:llwww.news.cnet.comlnews/O-1005-200-340395.html> (report-
ing on the Recording Industry Association of America's concern about free downloading of music
from the Internet).
16. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) initially attempted to block the
manufacture and sale of any consumer electronics devices that could play music in the MP3 file
format. MP3 allows the transmission of high quality music recordings over the Intemet, and does
not encorporate copy-protection technology. After failing to suppress MP3 entirely, the RIAA
entered into an agreement under which consumer electronics manufacturers are free to sell devices
that play MP3 files, but will later on offer consumers a voluntary software upgrade allowing them
to play music in an encrypted format, while disabling them from playing a confusingly defined
category of other music. The music industry is in the process of developing this more secure,
SDMI format, which will allow publishers to sell music in a more trusted environment. See Jessica
Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, I J. ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 213 (1999) <http:ll
www.law.wayne.edu/litnan/papers/freespeech.pdf>.
17. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Li-
censing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 246-51 (1996-97); see also Jessica Litman, The Excht-
sive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 43-46 (1994) (pointing out that copyright
protection is not necessary for a flourishing of creativity).
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imaginary; indeed, it is at the center of a growth industry. In the next section
of this paper, I will start by discussing the degree to which identifiability is
inherent in Internet architecture. I will then discuss new identification tech-
nology that companies have sought to put in place.
II. ANONYMITY AND IDENTIFmABILITY ON THE INTERNET
In the physical, face-to-face world, we encounter an imperfect blend of
anonymity and identifiability. We do not all know everything about each
other, nor are we are all completely anonymous. In some respects, we are
easily identifiable (a four-year-old cannot walk into a 7-11 and buy a copy of
Playboy); in others, we are not (an adult can, without showing identifica-
tion). We know some things about each other but not others; we negotiate
boundaries through social interaction.18
Internet architecture presents a different blend of anonymity and identifi-
ability.19 On one level, it provides for a higher degree of anonymity. "On
the Internet," as the old saw has Rover explain while sitting at his computer,
"nobody knows you're a dog."20 In ordinary social and commercial transac-
tions, it is easy to conceal one's identity, or to adopt a new one. Further, that
anonymity is for the most part socially acceptable. This has important ad-
vantages: It means, as Larry Lessig has explained, that one can explore the
Internet without an internal passport, without having to present credentials.21
On another level, this apparent anonymity is deceptive. The Internet
monitors the origin and destination of the packets that traverse it. It is there-
fore, in fact, extremely difficult to conceal one's identity while engaging in
Internet activities from a truly determined adversary (such as a law-
enforcement agency armed with subpoena power). And once one's identity
is revealed, extensive information about one's online activities may come
with it.
The most important reason for the absence of profound anonymity lies in
the Internet's reliance on "IP addresses" to get packets to their destinations.
IP addresses are the unique numbers that identify each computer connected
to the Internet. Just as it would be impractical for a person to receive postal
mail without a unique name-and-postal-address combination, a computer
cannot receive or send information over the global Internet without a unique
18. See Agre, supra note 7, 1 16.
19. I am indebted to Lorrie Cranor for emphasizing the points in the next two paragraphs.
20. This joke has sunk into the public consciousness; it was originally penned by Peter Stei-
ner, in a New Yorker cartoon. I owe the citation to Joseph M. Reagle Jr., Why the Internet is Good:
Community Governance That Works Well (Mar. 26, 1999) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edulpeople/
reaglelregulation-19990326.html>.
21. See Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace 7 (Apr. 3, 1998) (unpublished draft)
<http://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/lawscyberspace.pdf>.
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IP address.22 Further, every packet of information transmitted over the Inter-
net contains its origin and destination addresses in plain sight in its packet
headers.23 Thus, when I undertake any transaction over the Internet, I trans-
mit to the recipient (and anybody else listening in) the IP address of my
home computer.
For most residential Internet users, this is only a limited concern. Most
of us get IP addresses on a dynamic basis from our Internet service provid-
ers, using DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), so that we get dif-
ferent IP addresses each time we log on.24 While a law enforcement agency
armed with Intemet service provider records would be able to trace the IP
addresses we used during different logons, and thus track our online activity,
we are not at the mercy of the casual commercial or social observer.25
This concern may become somewhat more important with the introduc-
tion of a new Internet addressing structure known as IPv6.26 As currently
planned, IPv6 will incorporate an address configuration procedure under
which, if a computer is connected to the Internet via an ethernet card or cer-
tain other classes of hardware, and the IP address is not unilateraly set by a
DHCP or PPP server, then the computer's IP address will automatically in-
clude the unique identifier associated with that ethernet card or other hard-
ware.27 This will make it easier to match IP addresses to individual
22. This is oversimplified. Network address translation can allow a computer to function us-
ing an address, assigned by the local network, that is not globally unique. More simply, a user can
piggyback on the IP address of a remote computer by logging into a shell account on that computer.
The extent to which such a user's traffic can be traced to him individually (as opposed to the remote
server generally) depends on the information retained by that server. Finally, a particular com-
puter's IP address may change over time. See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
23. See Thomas Narten, Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in 1Pv6,
at 2-3 (Oct. 1999) <http:llsearch.ietf.orglintemet-drafls/draft-ietf-ipngwg-addrconf-privacy-O 1.txt>.
24. This is somewhat oversimplified. A DHCP server will sometimes return to an Internet
user the same address that it had used previously, if that address is still available. In certain con-
texts, a client could use the same address for months at a time. See id.
25. The situation is different if a computer's IP address is "static" as opposed to dynamic. In
that case, the address will be associated with that computer for an extended period of time. Users
with broadband, "always on" Internet connections are more likely to have persistent IP addresses.
Once a particular IP address is firmly associated with a user, it is easy to match that IP address
with the entity (an Internet service provider, corporation, government agency, etc.) to which the
relevant block of IP addresses was assigned. However, one cannot further match the IP address to
the identity of an individual user without information supplied either by the intermediate entity or
by the user himself (as in a registration database). See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Re-
quest for Participation and Comment from the Electronic Privacy Information Center <http://
vww.ftc.gov/bcp/profilinglcomments/shen.pdf>.
26. See R. Hinden Nokia & S. Deering, Cisco Systems, IP Version 6AddressingArchitecture
(July 1998) <ftp://fip.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2373.txt> (Network Working Group RFC 2373); Steve
King, Ruth Fax, Dimitry Haskin, Wenken Ling, Tom Meehan, Robert Fink & Charles E. Perkins,
The Case for IPv6 (Oct. 22, 1999) <http://search.ietf.orghintemet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-case-for-ipv6-
05.txt>.
27. See King et al., supra note 26, at 10; Narten, supra note 23, at 4.
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computers,2 8 and will make it possible for observers to pull together a given
device's Internet traffic even though the device, for instance a laptop, is con-
nected at different times to different networks at different physical loca-
tions.29 On the other hand, it should not affect the identifiability of the
Internet traffic of an ordinary user with a dial-up connection and no ethernet
card.30
In sum, it is inherent in Internet architecture that Internet traffic carries
identifying information along with it. At the same time, though, this infor-
mation is not cheaply and immediately useful on a commercial level. In par-
ticular, a mass-market content provider cannot rely solely on IP addresses to
identify residential users.31  Content providers want-and are beginning to
develop-cheaper and more precise tools better suited to their needs.
As of this writing, the most notorious system for feeding consumer in-
formation back to content providers is one quietly put in place by RealNet-
works, makers of the leading multimedia software. It became public some
time ago that each copy of RealPlayer, like Windows Media Player, con-
tained a globally unique identifier (GUID) that was transmitted to the pro-
vider when the user accessed streaming media.32 It only recently became
known that the same company's RealJukebox player transmitted information
back to its makers including the names of all the CDs the user played, the
number of songs recorded on her hard disk, the brand of portable MP3 player
she owned, and the music genre she listened to most.33 The information was
tied to a unique identification number that could be mapped to the user's
email address via the registration database. In short, RealNetworks had the
28. That will especially be the case if business information-exchange standards encourage the
matching of a person's name and address with the identifier of the ethernet card preinstalled in the
computer he buys. See note 78 infra.
29. See Narten, supra note 23, at 4-5. One of the developers of IPv6 has suggested changes in
the IPv6 addressing architecture to ameliorate this concern. Id. at 5-11.
30. See generally J. Bound & C. Perkins, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
1Pv5 (Feb. 25, 1999) <http'//search.ietforg/intemet-drafts/draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-14.txt> (discussing
DHCP as it relates to IPv6).
31. Instead, online advertisers tend to rely on cookies accepted by users and stored on their
hard disks. Firms use a technique called cookie synchronization to share cookies and their associ-
ated information across multiple sites. See Junkbusters, Profiling: Comments to the Dept. of
Commerce and Federal Trade Commission § 2.2 (Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.junkbusters.com/
profiling.html>. But see text accompanying note 82 infra (reporting Doublelick's statement that it
relies on IP addresses to target advertisements). The use and abuse of cookies is beyond the scope
of this paper, but their importance in online privacy issues cannot be overstated. See Deborah
Kong, Online Profiling on the Rise, SAN JOSE MERCURYNEWS, Jan. 3,2000, at C1.
32. See Mark D. Fefer, Media Player and Privacy, SEATTLE WKLY., Apr. 8-14, 1999 <http://
www.seattleweekly.comlfeatures/9914Itech-fefer.shtml>; see also Peter H. Lewis, Peekaboo! Ano-
nyinity Is Not Always Secure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at GI (repeating the conclusions of the
Seattle Weekly report).
33. See Richard M. Smith, The ReaUukeBox Monitoring Systen (Oct. 31, 1999) <http://
wvww.tia.net/sers/smithsfprivacy/realjb.hni>; Sara Robinson, CD Softvare Said to Gather Data
on Users: RealNetworks Receives Variety ofInformation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at Cl.
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capability to collect, in personally identifiable format, information regarding
the listening activities of each user of its software. Responding to negative
publicity, RealNetworks made available a software patch to disable Real-
Jukebox's data collection function,34 and announced a new version of Real-
Player software that would not transmit a GUID unless the user affirmatively
turned that feature on.35 The company noted, though, that some content pro-
viders might require that consumers enable the GUID in order to access their
content.36
Nor was this the first time a software-generated GUID gained public at-
tention. Users discovered not too long ago that various Microsoft applica-
tions label each of the documents they create with a unique identifier. If the
computer running the applications contains an ethernet card, the document
identifier incorporates that ethernet card's unique identifier, and thus defini-
tively identifies the computer in question.37 As a result, documents created
in Microsoft Word and Excel, and perhaps other Microsoft programs, can be
traced back to the originating computer. 3s Until recently, Microsoft's Win-
dows 98 Registration Wizard transmitted the ethernet card identifier to Mi-
crosoft upon software registration, along with the identification information
(name, address, phone number, etc.) entered by the user.39 Microsoft too has
backpedaled somewhat in response to publicity: It announced that it would
make a software patch available to prevent the insertion of the GUID into
Microsoft Office documents, and would stop collecting the information dur-
ing registrationAO Office 2000, it added, would not insert the GUID at all.41
Each of these systems has powerful identification capabilities, but is
limited in certain respects. Microsoft's is limited in scope, because the
GUID identifies an individual's computer only if that computer contains an
ethernet card.4A2 The RealNetworks system is limited in a different respect:
34. See Sara Robinson, RealNetworks to Stop Collecting User Data: Music Software Will No
Longer Transmit PersonalIniformation,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at C2.
35. See RealNetworks, RealNetworks Consumer Softvare Privacy Statement <http'JAvww.
realnetworks.com/company/privacy/software-privacy.html>.
36. See id.
37. See Junkbusters, Privacy Advisory on Microsoft Hardware IDs <http'J/wwv.,.junkbusters.
com/ht/en/microsoft.htlrI#advisory>.
38. See id.; Chris Oakes, Sniffing Out MS Security Glitch, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 8, 1999, 9 3
<http:l/vired.lycos.comlnewsnewslteehnologystory/18331.htnl>. At least Microsoft's ovn Web
site embedded the GUID in cookies. See Chris Oakes, Is Microsoft Tracking Visitors?, WIRED
NEWS, Mar. 12, 1999, 2 <http:/wired.lycos.com/newslnews/technology/story/18405.html>.
39. See John Markoff, Microsoft Will Alter Its Software in Response to Privacy Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, §1, at 1.
40. See Microsoft Addresses Cutomers'Privacy Concerns, 114 <http://www.microsofL.com/
presspass/features/1999103-08custletter2.htm>.
41. See id.
42. See Junkbusters, supra note 37; Advanced Streaming Format - Specification -Appendix:
GUIDs and UUIDs, % 6 <http:llwww.microsoft.comlasf/spec3/c.btm>.
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The GUIDs it assigns are not used by anyone other than RealNetworks.43
Although RealNetworks was in a position to use the GUID to catalog an in-
dividual's listening information, the system was not designed to be used by a
variety of content providers in multiple contexts.
m. INTEL AND THE PROCESSOR SERIAL NUMBER
Intel, which manufactures the vast majority of the chips powering per-
sonal computers today, introduced a technology in early 1999 that it de-
scribed as the foundation for a whole new world of trusted systems: the
Processor Serial Number, or PSN. The PSN is a unique identification num-
ber burned into each computer's central processing unit as part of the normal
manufacturing process.4 Intel. announced plans to incorporate the PSN into
all of its products, including not only its Pentium III chips for personal com-
puters, but also the microprocessors embedded in devices such as television
set-top boxes, telephones, and "Internet appliances." 45 Applications running
on any device equipped with a PSN can read the unique identification num-
ber and transmit it to any requesting remote server. Such a system could
provide a foundation for the reliable flow of identification information from
every consumer to Internet-based content providers.46
43. Each RealNetwork GUID is randomly generated by a RealNetworks consumer application
during installation. See Smith, supra note 33.
44. See Patrick Gelsinger, A Billion Trusted Computers, Speech at the RSA Data Security
Conference and Expo '99, 96 (Jan. 20, 1999) (transcript) <http:llwww.intel.com/pressrooml
archivelspeechesfpg012099.htm>.
45. See Robert Lemos, The Biggest Security 7hreat: You, ZDNET NEWS (Feb. 25, 1999)
<http:l./vww.zdnet.comlzdnn/storieslnewslO,4586,2216772,00.html> (referring to Intel's Strong-
ARM embedded processor, and quoting Michael Glancy, general manager of Intel's platform secu-
rity division). Intel purchased the StrongARM line of embedded processors in 1998; StrongARM
processors are currently used in cellular phones and handheld computers, and are suitable for use in
set-top boxes and other Interet-aware consumer electronics. See Lisa DiCarlo, Intel Seals Strong-
ARM Deal, PC WEEK ONLINE (Feb. 27, 1998) <http:llwww.zdnetcom/peweek/stories/news/
0,4153,288760,00.html>.
Intel also included a PSN, apparently inadvertently, in some Pentium II and Celeron chips.
See Robert Lemos, Intel Admits PHr Serial Snafu, PC WEEK ONLINE (Mar. 11, 1999) <http://
wwiv.zdneLcomfpcweek/storiesfnewslO,4153,2224186,00.html>; Ephraim Schwartz & Dan Briody,
Intel's Pentium Security Woes Continue, INFOWORLD ELECTRIC (Mar. 10, 1999) <http:l/
www.infoworld.comcgi-bin/displayStory.pl?990310.wcpsn.htm>. But see Juan Carlos Perez,
Some Intel Mobile Chips Dispense IDs, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 11, 1999) <http:llwww.
computerworld.com/homenews.nsf/all/9903113mobile> (quoting Howard High, Intel spokesman,
that the value returned by the P1 and Celeron chips may not be unique).
46. See text accompanying notes 47-58 infra. The PSN is not the only form of hardware-
based ID. Indeed, smart cards and biometrics provide more secure ways to uniquely identify a user
across a network. Windows NT 5.0 can be set to require smart cards for network authentication on
login. See MicroSoft Windows CE, Smart Cards (last modified Dec. 6, 1999) <http://
wwv.microsoftcom/windowscesmartcard/infofdefault.asp>. Smart cards can also be used with
Windows 95198 and Windows NT 4.0 to authenticate secure connections. See id. Intel is engaged
in active research on biometrics (fingerprints, facial images, voiceprints, retinal or iris images,
thermal images, or signature) for authentication and acquisition of network privileges. See INTEL
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In introducing the PSN, Intel vice-president Patrick Gelsinger explained
that the company was shifting its vision from "a world of a billion connected
computers" to "a billion trusted computers."47 A vision of a world fully
populated with myriad personal computers, each communicating with the
rest, he explained, is insufficient unless those connected computers are
trusted, and the first step on "the road to ... trusted connected PCs" is the
PSN.48 Because each computer's PSN is unique, he continued, the PSN pro-
vides a hardware framework for treating the home PC as part of a trusted
system49-that is, to allow servers on distant networks to authenticate the
identity of a home PC user, and administer authenticated permissioning and
rights management. 50 It could thus create a "trusted virtual world" for secure
virtual enterprises, business-to-consumer electronic commerce, and secure
delivery of high-value digital media content like movies and music.1
Gelsinger explained that the PSN, "enabl[ing] platforms and the users
that are on those platforms to be better identified,"52 was Intel's first building
block in constructing this system. "You think about this maybe as a chat
room, where unless you're able to deliver the processor serial number, you're
not able to enter that protected chat room ... providing a level of access
control."53
Atop that hardware framework, Intel was constructing the Common Data
Security Architecture (CDSA), a cross-platform software framework em-
CORP., USER AUTHENTICATION SERVICES (UAS) SPECIFICATION: EXTENSION TO THE CSSM
FRAMEWORK, at 6 (ver. 1.0 Sept. 1998) (draft) <http.//developer.intel.com/ial/security/does/
r2 O/license.htm> [hereinafter UAS SPECIFICATION]; see also RICHARD SARGENT, CDSA
EXPLAINED: A SOURCE BOOK FROM THE OPEN GROUP 59-60 (1998) (noting that Intel is working
with Veridicom to incorporate interfaces for biometrics into its software security architecture).
These technologies are primarily designed to enhance the security of a particular network, rather
than to identify a user to the Internet at large. But as with the Intel PSN, once a user is uniquely
identified, that information can be used to grant or deny him access to resources across a wide vari-
ety of Internet-connected systems.
47. Gelsinger, supra note 44, IN 3-4 (emphasis added).
48. Id. 66, 93.
49. See id. 61, 66, 99.
50. See id. 66-67.
51. Id. 17. On the other hand, the PSN was unlikely to achieve that result effectively. As
noted cryptographer Bruce Schneier urged, PSN-based authentication is inherently insecure because
a remote site cannot know whether a home PC's software is accurately reporting the hardware PSN.
See Bruce Schneier, Why Intel's ID Tracker Won't Work, ZDNET NEWs (Jan. 26, 1999)
<http:llvAww.zdnet.comlzdnlstorieslcomment/0,5859,2194863,00.htnml>.
52. Gelsinger, supra note 44, 66. Intel, indeed, worked with content providers to develop
Web sites that restrict access based on the user's PSN. The sites, though, used the PSN only to
determine whether the user's computer was a Pentium I. The idea was to develop processor-
intensive Web sites limited to Pentium m users, and thus sell the proposition that Pentium Ill-
equipped computers could show Web content that other computers could not. See David Flynn,
Pentium II-Only Sites Coming, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 2, 1999, at 8.
53. Gelsinger, supra note 44, 99.
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bodying a common security architecture.54 The CDSA framework, initiated
by Intel and developed in an open standards process, contemplates that inde-
pendent software and hardware vendors will provide "add-in modules" that
perform specific security functions for applications.55 Applications can thus
more easily be written to require that third parties establish their identity or
authentication before gaining access to intellectual property.56 Identity and
authorization, in such a trusted environment, are verified on the basis of
digital credentials; the Common Security Services Manager, part of CDSA,
facilitates linking digital certificates to trust protocols.57
Gelsinger announced plans to add significantly to the PSN and the
CDSA's capabilities the following year, "allowing... trusted access, adding
authenticated permissioning to PCs, [and] increasing levels of capability" in
the security architecture.58 He announced plans to add capability in 2001
relating to "platform and peripheral integrity," thus "accomplishing the
trusted transactions [and providing] a platform strong enough to bring all
forms of valuable content to the PC."59 It is easy to imagine that with an ar-
chitecture incorporating all of these capabilities, the hardware and software
of the home PC might enable a remote server to query that PC for its unique
PSN, determine whether the machine associated with that PSN has received
rights to play a movie, and (if so) deliver the movie in a form such that the
PC could play it a set number of times, but could not make a digital copy
outside the control of trusted systems. 60
The PSN excited considerable controversy. Privacy advocates requested
that the Federal Trade Commission initiate an inquiry,61 and followed that up
with a complaint formally asking the Commission to halt distribution of the
54. See Intel Architecture Labs, Common Data Security Architecture: Frequently Asked
Questions <http:lldeveloper.intel.comliallsecurity/faq.htm> (Question 1).
55. See id. (Question 2); UAS SPEcIFICATION, supra note 46 § 1.1.
56. See Intel Architecture Labs, Intel Common Data Security Architecture: Overview
<http://developer.intel.comlialsecurity>.
57. See INTEL CORP., INTEL SECURITY PROGRAM 3, 6 (1998) <ftp://download.intel.com/ialY
security/intelsp.pdf>.
58. Gelsinger, supra note 44, at 7.
59. Id.
60. This discussion to some extent elides the distinction between identification of computer
platforms and identification of consumers. The distinction comes into play to the extent that (a)
more than one consumer uses a single computer;, or (b) a single consumer uses more than one com-
puter. The latter case is most important in connection with consumer acceptance of trusted systems;
consumers may be reluctant to accept systems that limit them to a single computer in viewing the
works they purchase.
61. See Letter from Jeffrey Chester et al. to R. Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commis-
sion (Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.bigbrotherinside.com/ftc-letter.html> (letter from eight consumer
and privacy groups including the Electronic Privacy Information Center) [hereinafter Letter to
FTC].
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Pentium III as a violation of individual privacy.62 The Electronic Privacy
Information Center announced a boycott of Intel.63 Large PC makers re-
sponded by announcing that, when shipping Pentium I machines for the
consumer market, they would set the BIOS (the first software instructions a
computer loads when it boots) to make the PSN invisible to most programs.64
Intel announced plans to release software patches that consumers could use
to do the same thing 65 These developments, though, have not entirely qui-
eted the controversy over the PSN: A unit of the European Parliament, for
example, recently published a working paper urging that the relevant com-
mittees of the Parliament call upon the NSA and FBI to provide information
on their role in the PSN's creation, and suggesting that the Parliament "con-
sider legal measures to prevent PSN-equipped (or PSN-equivalent) chips
from being installed in the computers of European citizens, firms and or-
gani[z]ations."66
That manufacturers are shipping computers to consumers with the PSN
disabled does not completely dispose of this issue. One can imagine PC
owners finding themselves under significant pressure to turn PSN accessibil-
ity back on. Web sites can require a PSN as a condition of access. Software
applications-including personal finance software, word processing applica-
tions, email clients, browsers, and even the operating system-can be written
so as not to run unless the PSN is enabled. The markets for PC processors,
operating systems, and major classes of applications in the PC environment,
after all, are highly concentrated.67 Information and entertainment resources
62. See Center for Democracy & Tech., Press Release: Privacy and Consumer Groups File
Complaint Against Intel at Federal Trade Commission <http/wwvi.cdtorglpress/O22699press.shtml>.
63. See Big Brother Inside, Protect Your PCs Privacy 35 <http://wwwv.bigbrotherinside.
com/#who> (describing the efforts and reasoning behind the boycott).
64. See Robert Lemos, Big PC Makers Decide to Disable Chip ID: IBM, Dell, Gateway and
Compaq Shipping PCs with the Technology Off, Letting Users Decide, ZDNET NEWS (Feb. 26,
1999) <http:f/www.zdnet.comzdnnstoriesnewslO,4586,2217252,00.html>. I write "most pro-
grams" because it appears that even a seemingly invisible PSN may be vulnerable to hacking. See
New Pentium III Security Flaw?, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 11, 1999) <http://wired.lycos.comnews/
news/technology/story/18395.html>; Andy Riga, Zero-Knowledge Runs at Intel, Again, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, May 5, 1999, at Dl.
65. See Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Elizabeth Corcoran, Intel Drops Plans to Activate Chip IDs,
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at El <httpi/www.washingtonpostcomiwp-srvlwashtechldailyjan99
intel26.htm>.
66. DR. FRANCKLEPREVOST, DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK OF
ABUSE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION: ENCRYPTION AND CRYPTOSYSTEMS IN ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE § 8(D) (European Parliament Scientific and Technical Options Assessment Panel
Working Paper No. PE 168.184 / Part 3/4, 1999) <http:llwwvv.europarl.eu.intldg4/stoaenpublipdfl
98-14-01-3en.pdf>.
67. On the PC processor market, see, for example, National Semi Quits the Field, WIRED
NEWS (May 5, 1999) <http:llwired.lycos.comlnewslnewslbusinesslstory/19508.html>. Eighteen
months after buying PC processor manufacturer Cyrix, National Semiconductor announced it would
exit the market, stating "we cannot afford to fight Intel." Id. National sold Cyrix to Via Technolo-
gies and agreed to manufacture chipsets for Via; Intel has taken the position that that deal is illegal.
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on the Net are similarly characterized by a small number of powerful pub-
lishers existing alongside a huge number of weak ones.68 To the extent that
powerful publishers control attractive intellectual property, they have market
power that they can use to influence consumers' choices, and to push the en-
vironment toward one in which consumers consent to become part of a
trusted architecture. 69
This advantage, further, would not flow merely to those individual pub-
lishers with the best market position. It seems unlikely that consumers, even
if they have the tools to do so, would routinely toggle the PSN on every time
they wish to run a protected program or access a protected Web site, and then
immediately toggle it off. It has been reported that once a PSN is enabled, it
Will be quite difficult for the ordinary consumer, with the tools typically
available to such a consumer today, to turn it off.70 But without regard to the
ease or difficulty of that step, inertia is a powerful force. It seems most
likely that a typical consumer seeking access to protected software or Web
sites would simply turn the PSN on and keep it on, available to anyone to
whom his software had the capability to display it.
Chastened by the public reaction to the PSN, Intel retreated and re-
grouped. It has not mentioned the PSN in any public statement in recent
months; instead, it has sought to focus attention on its new Trusted Comput-
ing Platform Alliance (TCPA) initiative.71 Like the trusted computing pro-
gram Intel had earlier announced, the TCPA is seeking to deliver an
"enhanced HW [hardware] and OS [operating system] based trusted
computing platform" to ensure, among other things, "[p]latform
[a]uthentication"--to provide a standard way for outsiders to query a com-
puter and establish its owner's identity, thus establishing "confidence in in-
teracting with [that] platform."72 This time, however, TCPA statements
emphasize that computer owners must control their personal information and
See Michael Kanellos, How Via, National May Skirt Intel Restrictions, CNET NEws.cOM (July 7,
1999) <http:/.news.cnetcomlnews0-1003-200-344532.html?stne.h..ni>.
68. Today, one-tenth of 1% of all Web sites capture approximately 32% of user volume. See
LADA A. ADAMIC & BERNARDO A. HUBERMAN, XEROX PALO ALTO RESEARCH CENTER, THE
NATURE OF MARKETS IN THE WORLD WIDE WEB 4 (1999) <http://www.parc.xerox.com/istY
groups/iea/www/webmarkets.html>. The study suggests that the market for Internet users' attention
will be characterized by winner-take-all dynamics.
69. See Gimbel, supra note 12, at 1683-85; Letter to FTC, supra note 61.
70. See Niall McKay, Pentium 1II Serial Numbers Hacked, SALON 3, 1 7 (Feb. 24, 1999)
<http:llwww.salon.com21st/logl1999/02221og.html>.
71. See Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, Background <www.trustedpc.orglhome/
home.htm>. The TCPA was formed by Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Microsoft as well as
Intel, id., but Intel appears to be providing at least the administrative infrastructure. See, e.g., Reg-
ister.com, Whois Results for Trustedpc.com <http:/lwww.register.com/whois-results.gi?domain-
trustedpe.com> (illustrating that Intel registered the domain name for the TCPA's Web site).
72. TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORM ALLIANCE, TCPA OVERVIEW PRESENTATION 3, 9, 10
(1999) <http://vww.trustedpe.orglpress.html> (emphasis omitted) (slide presentation).
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the system's authentication capabilities.73 The TCPA has not yet released a
specification with details to the public.
IV. TRUSTED SYSTEIMS AND COMMON IDENTIFIERS
A. Introduction
I want to explore some of the social implications of implementing, on a
widespread basis, trusted systems based on identifiers such as the PSN. In
that connection, it seems to me that two characteristics of the PSN are nota-
ble. First, the PSN is keyed to the holder's identity, rather than his charac-
teristics. It enforces a particular model of trust, in which to learn the
characteristics of a particular would-be information recipient, a publisher
first ascertains that person's identity and then looks up the characteristics
associated with that identity.
This model stands in contrast to a more privacy-protective approach, in
which a person can present credentials verifying certain characteristics, such
as country of residence, without necessarily disclosing his identity at all.74
For an example, consider an idea floated by Ira Magaziner in 1998.75 Maga-
ziner was looking for an answer to one problem presented by Internet ano-
nymity: It undercuts the ability of geographic jurisdictions to tax, because it
may not be clear to the merchant and interested governments whether taxes
are due and to whom. Magaziner suggested that consumers could make pur-
chases online through the use of "electronic 'resident cards'" encoding their
country of residence, so that escrow agents could collect taxes associated
with that jurisdiction.76 The propo.al was unworkable, but was in one re-
spect privacy-friendly: It contemplated that people would reveal, and carry
with them online, a single personal characteristic (their country of residence),
without having to reveal any other characteristics. The merchant could learn
a buyer's residence, but that information transaction would not reveal his
name. The PSN, by contrast, eschews this approach. For the PSN to be used
as the basis for a trusted system, the content provider must correlate the PSN
with its other data relating to the individual owning that computer, by tying
all of that data to the single identifier that the PSN represents.
The second notable characteristic of the PSN is that it is a common iden-
tifier. That is, it is well-suited to use by different information collectors in
73. See id. at 5, 12.
74. See Agre, supra note 7, 18, 35; David Chaum, Security Without Identification: Trans-
action Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete, 28 COMM. OF THE ACM 1030, 1030 (1985); Lessig
& Resnick, supra note 1, at 412-13. Part V infra discusses this in greater detail.
75. Ira Magaziner, at the time, was the President's Senior Internet Advisor.
76. See Internet Taxation System is Mulled by White House, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 11, 1998, at
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unrelated transactions, increasing the ease with which a wide range of infor-
mation about a person can be aggregated into a single overall dossier.77 The
greatest obstacle to efficient aggregation and manipulation of data today is
the need to reconcile inconsistent formats and identifiers;78 a standard, com-
mon GUID can eliminate that obstacle.79 To the extent that a variety of
content providers and other merchants have each collected information tied
to individual PSNs, it is a simple matter to compile those files into larger
databases.
B. Privacy
Widespread deployment of trusted systems based on such global identi-
fiers will have social consequences. Such systems-in which the user's
computer identifies itself during every transaction, to anybody who asks-
are pernicious from a privacy perspective. They allow the user to be tracked
through cyberspace more easily and thoroughly than is possible under cur-
rent technology. They have the potential to make the Internet a forum in
which database proprietors have what Phil Agre has referred to as a "God's-
eye view of the world"--a perspective in which all things have their true
names and our Internet representations can straightforwardly be traced back
to our real-world identities.80 Under such an architecture, a much greater
77. See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM.,' Aug. 1992, at 96 <http://
ganges.cs.tcd.ielmepeirce/ProjectChaum/sciam.html>.
78. For an example of an attempt to gain the benefits of such standardization, consider the
RosettaNet specification, under development by a consortium of information technology compa-
nies. See RosettaNet, Executive Overview <www.rosettanet.orglgeneraloverview.html>. The point
of the RosettaNet project is to build an XML-based language of common data descriptors and busi-
ness processes to streamline electronic business-to-business transactions. See, e.g., Ellis Booker,
XML Greases Supply Chain, INTERNET WEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 1 <http:/vww.techweb.com/
seldirectlink.cgi?INW19990823SO00I> (describing the current status of XML-driven supply
chains). Yet an initial draft of the RosettaNet specification raised controversy in part because of the
ease with which such standardization allows the sharing of personally identifiable information:
The specification directed vendors to provide the purchaser's name and address to every company
involved in the item's production. See James Glave, RosettaNet: Nothing Personal?, WIRED NEWS
(Sept. 10, 1999) <http://vired.lycos.com/newslnews/technology/story/21699.htrrl>; James Glave,
Vie Killer Consumer Gossip App, WIRED NEWS (Sept 10, 1999) <http://wired.lycos.com/news/
news/tecinology/story/21668.html>.
79. See Graham Greenleaf, "IP, Phone Home": ECMS, (c)-tech, and Protecting Privacy
Against Surveillance by Digital Works 7-8 (1999) (paper presented to the 21st International Confer-
ence on Privacy and Personal Data Protection held September 13-15, 1999, in Hong Kong) <http://
www2.austlii.edu.auf-grabampublications/jp_privacy> ("The success, importance and danger of
ECMS [electronic copyright management systems] is likely to depend in large part on the extent to
which they achieve interoperability between multiple publishers (within one ECMS), and ulti-
mately, between different ECMS and different media types.").
80. Agre, supra note 7, % 23, 26. Agre, I should note, disclaims authorship. See Email from
Phil Agre to the author (May 10, 1999) (on file with the author). He cites Donna Haraway's refer-
ence to the "god-trick" in connection with the postulated ability to see like a God from a position
transcendent and outside of lived experience, see DONNA 3. HARAWAY, Situated Knowledges: The
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege ofPartial Perspective, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND
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proportion of ordinary transactions would require consumers to present
unique identification numbers that would in turn be digitally linked to a
much wider range of personal information. To the extent that collecting
identification and assembling dossiers is easy, content providers may do so
even when they have no compelling use for the information.
Advertisers and others already see great value in compiling dossiers of
personally identifiable information for each of us. Consider, in this regard,
the recent Abacus-Doubleclick merger. The combined company announced
plans to cross-reference Abacus's database of consumer buying habits, con-
taining real names and addresses and detailed buying information, with Dou-
bleclick's database of consumer Internet surfing and buying habits.81
Doubleclick targets ads to users, based on "dozens of characteristics, in-
cluding geographic[al] region, language, and business."8 2 It backed off plans
to associate its online information about individual consumers with Abacus's
personally identifiable offline information only in the face of Federal Trade
Commission and state investigations, private lawsuits, and a consumer boy-
cott.8 3 The adoption of common identifiers would facilitate the correlation of
individual data profiles across databases without public relations headaches.
Systems facilitating the close tracking of content-of what people read,
view, or listen to-seem particularly problematic. All of these are the con-
stitutents of human thought. In the analog world, information or entertain-
ment goods are commonly sold on a cash basis, leaving no paper or
electronic trail. The copies themselves have no surveillance capabilities, and
cannot report back to their makers. The copyright owner, indeed, collects no
information about the user at all.8 4 Trusted systems threaten to abandon
those rules, facilitating the monitoring of individual thought. They raise the
specter of the Panopticon, and of subtle and not-so-subtle pressures on indi-
WOMEN: THE REiNVENTION OF NATURE, 183, 193 (1991), and Edwin Burtt's much earlier refer-
ence to a similar perspective in THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL
SCIENCE: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICALESSAY (1925). Neither author developed the idea, though,
in relation to computer representations of identity, much less privacy policy.
81. See Courtney Macavinta, DoubleClick, Abacus Merge in $1.7 Billion Deal, CNET
NEWS.COM (Nov. 24, 1999) <http:llnews.cnet.comnewsO-1005-200-1463444.html>; Courtney
Macavinta, Privacy Advocates Target Abacus Shareholders, CNET NEWS.COM (June 29, 1999)
<http:lvww.news.cnet.comlnewslO.1005-200-344244.html>; Courtney Macavinta, Privacy Fears
Raised by Doubleclick Database Plans, CNET NEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2000) <http://news.cneLcoml
news/0-1005-200-1531929.htl>.
82. See Doubleclick, Annual Report-Overview: Making Internet Advertising Work <http.//
www.doubleclick.net/annualreportloverview.htm>.
83. See Diane Anderson & Keith Perine, Privacy Issue Makes Doubleclick a Target,
STANDARD (Feb. 3, 2000) <http:llwww.thestandard.comlarticle/display/0,1151,9480,00.html>; Jeri
Clausing, Michigan Moves Against Doubleclick, CYBERTIMES (Feb. 19, 2000) <http://vlvw.
nytimes.comllibrary/techlOO/02/eyber/articlesllgdoubleclickhtml>; Bob Tedeschi, In a Shift, Dou-
bleclick Puts Off Its Plan for Wider Use of the Personal Data of Internet Consumers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3,2000, atC5.
84. See Greenleaf, supra note 79, 8.
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viduals to eschew socially or governmentally disfavored information
goods.85
C. Communications Policy
A second set of consequences relates to the effects of this technology on
the economics and politics of content markets. To begin with, all techno-
logical measures protecting digital content (of which trusted systems are a
subset) raise an important set of issues typically associated with intellectual
property law. Such measures allow sellers of entertainment or information to
assert effective control over uses that are privileged by intellectual property
law, and over subject-matter that is assigned by intellectual property law to
the public domain. That is, they enable sellers to exercise control notwith-
standing intellectual property law's judgment that society in those circum-
stances is best served by free use of the material by the public at large.86
Others have written cogently about these points, and I will not linger long on
them here.87 Instead, I want to raise broader concerns, which I believe reso-
nate less with those of intellectual property law, and more with those of
communications policy generally.8
85. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws De-
signed to Protect 7hen, 12 BERKELEYTECH. LJ'. 161, 184-85 (1997).
86. Given its enactment of the Digital Copyright Millennium Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), which criminalizes the act of "circumventing" such technological pro-
tections, Congress appears not to share that concern. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anticircumvention Regulations Need to be Revised
<httpAvww.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/Samuelson lPdigecohtm.hlm> (criticizing the anti-
circumvention rules).
87. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Informa-
tion Age: The Impact ofArticle 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactions
in hifonnation and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998) (collection of arti-
cles critically examining proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code); James Boyle,
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv.
177 (1997) (explaining that legal rules barring circumvention of technological protection measures
clothe both the state and content providers with power they would not otherwise have); Julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (ar-
guing that self-enforcing digital contracts grant publishers absolute control inconsistent with copy-
right and First Amendment principles); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on
the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997) (emphasizing the broad scope of rights granted to
copyright holders by a rote application of the existing statute to Internet technology); Lawrence
Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635 (1996) (suggesting
that technological protection of intellectual property can make legal protections irrelevant, and thus
privatize law); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON.
L. REV. 587 (1997) (pointing out the dangers to important information-policy concerns presented
by the intersection of copyright law and Internet technology); Greenleaf, supra note 79 (observing
that technical protections of intellectual property may obviate public interest protections in intel-
lectual property law).
88. Cf Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 395-97
(1999) (suggesting that copyright scholars, precisely because they tend to approach technological
May 2000] 1271
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
It is useful here to review two capabilities that trusted systems based on
common identifiers give to sellers of entertainment or information. First, the
reliable identification of the would-be consumer, together with any other in-
formation the seller can collect describing that would-be consumer, helps
give the seller individualized information about each member of its target
audience. Second, the access and copy protection capabilities of the system
mean that the seller has much stronger control over which consumers get
access to the work; the seller therefore can sharply limit any secondarymar-
ket in the work.
In the Old Way of Doing Things, technical inefficiencies made it diffi-
cult to disseminate speech to a dispersed but tightly controlled group of
folks. There was always some leakage: If you wanted to disseminate
speech, you had to give up some control over its dissemination. For exam-
ple, once a content owner distributed a copy of a work, it had no technologi-
cal means of preventing the owner of that copy from selling, loaning,
privately displaying, or giving away the copy as he chose.89 And the copy-
right law's "first sale doctrine" denied content owners the ability to impose
such restrictions within the four comers of the copyright law.90 These limi-
tations on content owners' effective rights helped democratize access to
content. They allowed gratis redistribution of, and secondary markets in,
copies of the works. Though content owners have complained that the Inter-
net threatens to divest them of any control over the distribution of their
works, trusted systems threaten to eliminate even the small avenues for roy-
alty-free redistribution that exist in the nondigital world.91
It is worth lingering on the role of sharing, and other forms of redistribu-
tion, in the nontrusted system world. "Small-scale, decentralized reproduc-
tion of intellectual property" has long been a fact of life in markets for
information, entertainment, and computer software.92 People copy music
tapes and CDs for themselves, family, and friends; they photocopy magazine
articles; they allow family and friends to use, and copy, their computer soft-
ware. They persist in doing so, notwithstanding the best efforts of the copy-
right industries to convince them that it is illegal, largely because they find it
protection systems from an intellectual property standpoint, have been insufficiently appreciative of
the virtues of technological protections).
89. See Litman, supra note 87, at 600-01.
90. See id.
91. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
92. Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal
Copying Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 255 (1989); see also Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson &
Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999) (investigating how
consumer sharing of information goods affects seller profits); Litman, Copyright Noncompliance
(Or JWy We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), supra note 17; Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimi-
nation, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845,
852-56 (1997) (discussing the economic impacts of unauthorized sharing).
1272 [V'ol. 52:1251
TRUSTED SYSTEMS
hard to believe that this is something the law does or should proscribe.93
And that system seems to work-at least, it has not obviously injured in any
palpable way producer incentives to create intellectual property.
The nontrusted-system world is also characterized by a lot of sharing, in
the vernacular sense, that does not implicate copyright law. As I noted
above, people lend each other analog copies of protected works, and read,
watch, or listen to works they have borrowed, all without implicating the
copyright laws at all. At least in a static analysis, 94 both of these sorts of
sharing are good, since they increase the distribution of information and thus
social benefit without any social cost.95 Put another way, sharing allows the
distribution of information at the optimal demand price, because that price is
equal to the marginal cost of distribution, which in this case is close to zero.96
The most successful institutions in American life today that are based on
such sharing are public libraries, which were established precisely to enable
large-scale sharing of analog works.
The trusted-system world could involve a number of changes to this
status quo. The content provider's enhanced control over access to the work
could constrain both types of sharing I have described above. It would allow
content providers to sharply limit the small-scale copying of intellectual
property that has become both accepted and commonplace among consumers
today, but that producers contend violates their copyrights. It could also
greatly limit the small- and large-scale lending and borrowing of intellectual
property that takes place today and is unimpeachably consistent with the
copyright laws. After all, as noted above, the control given content providers
by trusted systems does not rest on whether the content provider can assert
intellectual property rights in the work, or whether a particular use of the
work by a consumer would violate those rights.
The trusted-system world also seems well-suited to facilitate discrimina-
tion on the part of the content provider, a change with more ambiguous re-
sults. Most obviously, trusted systems will facilitate price discrimination-
that is, the content provider can ask different consumers to pay different
prices, unrelated to the provider's own costs. That is not the way markets
typically work: Most commonly, a producer sets a uniform price, which
each consumer chooses to pay or not pay. Sellers cannot effectively engage
93. See Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing),
supra note 17, at 252-53; Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR.
L. REV. 19,40-41 (1996).
94. But see text following note 108 infra (discussing the dynamic impact of sharing).
95. See Kenneth I Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
it) THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609
(1962); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclo-
sure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354,424 (1999).
96. See Benkler, supra note 95, at 424 & n.273.
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in price discriminatibn unless three conditions are met.97 First, the seller
must be able to prevent (or limit) arbitrage-it must ensure that buyers who
paid a low price do not turn around and resell the information or entertain-
ment to someone who would otherwise be willing to pay the content provider
the higher price. Otherwise, any attempt by the producer to partition the
market would be unavailing. Trusted systems make this possible by greatly
enhancing the content provider's ability to control any redistribution of the
work.
Second, the seller must have market power. All copyright owners have
some degree of market power because of the legal control that intellectual
property law gives them; that is one reason they are able to charge prices in
excess of marginal cost. Some, naturally, have more market power than oth-
ers, based on the demand for the work and the availability of near-
substitutes.
Finally, the seller must be able to set prices in a way that in fact reflects
consumers' willingness to pay. Trusted-system technology can make this
possible in two ways. First, as noted above, a trusted online architecture
based on global user or platform identifiers will allow content providers to
tie each consumer to a wide range of personally identifiable information. For
example, when the consumer presents her PSN to gain access to a digital
work, the content provider will be able to pull up other information associ-
ated with that PSN in order to make a judgment about the particular con-
sumer's willingness to pay.98 Alternatively, the content provider can shift its
payment model from the "sale" model prevalent today, in which the con-
sumer buys a copy of the work and can then read, listen to, or watch that
copy an unlimited number of times without further payment, to a "pay-per-
read" system in which the customer pays a smaller amount on each occasion
that she reads, listens to, or watches the work. This allows the content pro-
vider to collect more money from those customers who want to use the work
many times and presumably are willing to pay more for that ability, and less
from those who want to view the work only once. The difference between
those prices is largely unrelated to the content provider's own costs.99
Is this price discrimination a good thing or a bad one? Some have ar-
gued that it is benefiial.00 Price discrimination in information goods is so-
97. See Meurer, supra note 92, at 870.
98. Economists refer to this as third-degree price discrimination. See W. KIP ViSCUSl, JOHN
M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 290-91
(2d ed. 1995).
99. This falls within a category that economists refer to as second-degree price discrimination.
See id. at 249-55, 290-91.
100. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 5 (arguing that price discrimination makes information
products available to a wider range of consumers). But see Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property
as Price Discrimination: Inplications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998) (querying
Fisher's premises).
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cially useful, the argument runs, because it increases the distribution of in-
formation. Without price discrimination, the content provider must charge a
single market price, and people unwilling to pay that price will be shut out of
the market entirely. If the content provider can engage in price discrimina-
tion, by contrast, it can charge every consumer the exact price that she is
willing to pay, thus simultaneously.maximizing profits and maximizing the
number of people who will be exposed to the information and entertainment
in question. "[W]e can say with confidence that many more consumers [will
benefit] from the author's creation."10'
The matter, though, is not nearly so straightforward. Price discrimina-
tion is unquestionably good for producers since it converts consumer surplus
into producer profits. But, as a general matter, whether price
discrimination increases overall welfare is a more difficult question, resting
on the facts of each case.102 An increase in the distribution of the good is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for increasing total welfare.103
More to the point, in thinking about whether the price discrimination en-
abled by trusted systems would be a good thing, we need to ask the question,
"Compared to what"? One of the key reasons that trusted systems enable
price discrimination is that they sharply decrease sharing; they are designed
to eliminate any redistribution of the information good beyond the control of
the content provider. That is, price discrimination allows the sale of infor-
mation to consumers willing to pay less, but at the expense of cutting off ex-
isting means, through sharing and secondary markets, of getting the
information or entertainment at low or no cost to some of those same con-
sumers. Indeed, from a static perspective sharing is a more efficient way of
allowing the market to reach those consumers, since it makes the good avail-
able to them at a price more nearly approaching the zero marginal cost of
supplying it to them.
Secondary markets, involving redistribution of information goods after
their first sale and outside the control of the initial seller, can do the same job
as price discrimination of getting information goods at lower prices to lower-
valuation users. That is what used bookstores are all about. The price dis-
crimination that trusted systems may facilitate therefore may not increase the
number of consumers getting the good at all; it may simply ensure that the
low-valuation consumers receive the good from the initial seller rather than
someone else.104 Further, it does so at the distributional cost of shifting all
surplus away from consumers.
101. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1239.
102. See ViScusi 'TAL., supra note 98, at 290-95; Meurer, supra note 92, at 896-98.
103. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 98, at 293-95; Meurer, supra note 92, at 898.
104. See Gordon, supra note 100, at 1378-89.
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The points I have made so far are open to a variety of counterarguments.
First, it might be argued that price discrimination will do a better job of get-
ting the information or entertainment to low-valuation users, many of whom
may not have the opportunity to gain access to the work through resale or
sharing. The copyright-law implications of issues surrounding small-scale
redistribution, even when no new copies are created (aside from the RAM
copies that are associated with any invocation of a digital work), are hotly
debated within the legal community. Large-scale copying and redistribution
of digital works is illegal even when no price is charged.'0S Yet public li-
braries, at least, are set up precisely for the purpose of getting free informa-
tion works to users unwilling to pay the price set by the market. Consumers
interested in viewing a work only once and willing to wait until it is available
can borrow from the library; those interested in viewing the work multiple
times are more inclined to buy it. This is precisely the sort of result price
discrimination is supposed to achieve.
By contrast, it is unclear to what extent price discrimination in practice
can achieve the advantages theory promises for it. It is difficult to gauge
consumer preferences precisely, and publishers are unlikely to drop prices
too far based on guesses about a particular class of consumers' willingness to
pay. While theoretical perfect price discrimination promises perfectly effi-
cient markets, real-world third-degree discrimination will fall short of that
ideal, as publishers group consumers by second-best proxy characteristics
and attempt to set prices for each group. Nor will consumers easily accept
second-degree discrimination: The splashy failure of DIVX, a pay-per-view
movie format, should give rise to some doubt about the enthusiasm with
which ordinary folks will embrace usage-based prices for digital works.106
Next, one might argue that if sharing were technologically disallowed
then market prices would fall. Without the possibility of sharing, the argu-
ment runs, information goods are not as valuable to purchasers. Yet when
the content provider must set a single market price, it cannot easily raise that
price to take into account the benefits of sharing, because different buyers
will place significantly different values on the ability to share (and will in
105. See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat 2678 (codi-
fied at, inter alia, 17 U.S.C. §§ 506-07 & 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319-2320); William McCall, College Stu-
dent Convicted of Piracy, AP ONLINE, Aug. 21, 1999, available in WESTLAW, WL 22036202
(describing the first conviction under the 1997 law).
106. The DIVX plan was that a user would purchase a videodisk for S4-5, and have free ac-
cess for 48 hours after the first play. After that time, the user would pay a fee for every subsequent
viewing; those viewings would be purchased through a central server connected to the DIVX player
by telephone line. See DAVID DRANOVE & NEIL GANDEL, THE DVD VS. DVX STANDARD WAR:
NETvoRK EFFECTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF VAPORWARE 8 (Tel Aviv Univ. Eltan Berlgas
School of Economics Working Paper No. 14-99, 1999). DIVX was discontinued, for lack of con-
sumer interest, in June 1999. See Carl Laron, Of Edsels and DIX, ELECTRONICS NOW, Sept. 1,
1999, at 2.
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fact share with markedly different numbers of people).107 Moreover, the ex-
istence of leakage also acts to constrain prices, by providing a near-substitute
for the purchased good.10
Finally and most obviously, one might argue that this analysis overlooks
the dynamic impact of sharing and the nature of secondary markets in digital
works: Sharing and resale do not generate revenues to the content provider,
so they do not provide incentives to stimulate production. More baldly, one
might argue that my discussion is in essence an argument for piracy-which
will certainly lower prices to the consumer, but at the cost of diminishing
incentives to produce. Secondary markets in the digital world, the argument
runs, may involve large numbers of illegal perfect copies. Sale of those
copies cuts directly into the profits, and thus the incentives, of the initial pro-
ducer.
I do not contest that producer incentives are necessary. Publishers must
be able to sell information goods at a price sufficiently above marginal cost,
and for a sufficiently long period of time, to recover their fixed (first-copy)
costs. Otherwise, they would lose money. To that end, there must be suffi-
cient entry barriers limiting other folks' ability to sell those works as
cheaply. We do not know, though, how much in the way of incentives pro-
ducers need.109 Ordinary economic theory suggests that publishers will in-
vest so long as they expect profits, taking into account normal rates of return.
If publishers have adequate incentives even without the extra rents that price
discrimination gives them, then we may get a better social result by reaching
lower-valuation users through secondary markets, sharing, or even some de-
gree of piracy than through the increased control that trusted systems
bring.1i0
Further, there is a connection between media concentration and the
power of information providers to identify consumers and to thus discrimi-
nate. To the extent that sellers' ability to price discriminate will rest on their
access to personally identifiable information about buyers, publishers with
access to those databases will have a competitive advantage over those who
107. Bakos et al., supra note 92, engage in a much more sophisticated analysis of this phe-
nomenon. The authors conclude that sharing decreases producer profit when the diversity in team
size, defined as the number of consumers sharing any particular copy of the good, exceeds the di-
versity in individual consumer valuations. They note that seller profit is enhanced if high-valuing
consumers tend to share with low-valuing consumers rather than with each other, and if low-valuing
consumers tend to share with a greater number of people than do high-valuing consumers. Both of
these contingencies will tend to "even out" the value that each team places on the good, and thus
will allow the producer to reflect that value more nearly in its selling price. Id. at 122-27.
108. See Benkler, supra note 95, at 433 n.302.
109. See Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, supra note 17, at 44-46.
110. See Bakos et. al., supra note 92, at 148 ("[P]rofitability and social efficiency need not go
hand in hand: sharing can be profitable [for content providers] in situations where it is not efficient,
and efficient in situations where it is not profitable.").
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do not. This may have two negative effects. First, it will tend to concentrate
media markets-and, to the extent those markets are characterized by win-
ner-take-all dynamics,"' will help determine who those winners are. Sec-
ond, it will increase the value of the dossiers, and thus increase the
commercial pressure on privacy.
The control facilitated by trusted systems and common identifiers may
allow other sorts of discrimination as well. Most generally, it will increase
producers' ability to pick and choose who will be allowed to view or read
particular works. Given the power of a common identifier such as Intel's
PSN to facilitate the association of a wide range of information with a given
personal identifier, producers could in theory use these tools to allow access
to a speech work only by persons who live in preferred zip codes, have cer-
tain levels of family income, or are white. There may be only limited cir-
cumstances in which a mass marketer of entertainment and information
would have an incentive to do so: Most obviously, perhaps, a publisher
might discriminate because of ideological motivations, or if particular con-
tent gained cachet from only limited distribution. From a free speech and
communications policy standpoint, though, it seems disturbing to see exten-
sive social investment in a technology built around the ability to prevent the
movement of speech and information to the public at large.
For the most part, today, content producers and consumers share control
over the uses and dissemination of speech works. Content producers have
extensive control by virtue of their ability to produce and license the tech-
nological artifacts (such as film reels) embodying those works, reinforced by
the rights granted them by the copyright law. Consumers have some control
as well, by virtue of their own abilities to use, copy, and manipulate such
works in ways that the copyright law either does not forbid or expressly
privileges,!12 or in ways that have been effectively immune from copyright
enforcement. And because these are speech works, that distribution of con-
trol has political consequences. It shapes the overall movement of informa-
tion and expression within society. The rise of trusted systems based on
common identifiers would shift that control.'13
111. See note 68 supra.
112. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (privileging consumers' noncommercial use of digital audio
recording devices, digital audio recording media, analog recording devices, and analog recording
media for making musical recordings); Recording Indus. Ass'n v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to enjoin the manufacture and sale of the Rio portable music
player, which plays downloaded MP3 files).
113. See generally LAWRENCE LEssiG, CODE AND OTHER LAWs OF CYBERSPACE 154-56
(1999) (raising equity-based concerns).
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V. IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS
In short, trusted systems based on common identifiers that are tied to
consumers' real-world identities have plainly undesirable privacy conse-
quences. Their consequences for the structure of content markets appear to
be negative on balance. And yet, one might think, they are unavoidable if we
are to allow content providers control over exploitation of their works in the
networked digital environment. That statement, though, is not correct. In
fact, the Internet's architecture can support trusted systems, and the con-
comitant control by content providers over works of information and enter-
tainment, without any need for common identifiers.
Recall the original concern driving industry plans for unique identifica-
tion of Internet-connected computers and consumers: Content providers
wish to be sure that a packet stream requesting access comes from a person
who has paid or is otherwise entitled to access. One way to accomplish that
result is to tag every computer/consumer with a single identifier that shows
up in the packet stream requesting access and allows the provider to refer-
ence a database of consumers' characteristics. But that approach conveys
much more information to the content provider than the provider actually
needs.
What the content provider needs is a way to verify that the user has spe-
cific credentials: that the user has paid, or that he has some other character-
istic that the content provider desires in its readers. Establishing the user's
identity is an instrumental step towards verifying his credentials. Yet it is
well-established in the cryptography literature that one can prove credentials
without proving identity: That is the basis for anonymous digital cash., 4 A
person, for example, can interact with other entities through a "pseudo-
nym -- a name that is reliably associated with that individual in a particular
context through cryptographic techniques, but cannot be associated with
other names the person uses in other contexts.'" 5
The word "pseudonym" sounds vaguely disreputable, but the goal is
simple and usually honorable: It is to allow the user to enter into transac-
tions and relationships in which they can be held accountable, without al-
lowing data miners to collect into a single global profile the universe of
transactions that the user enters into. It is consistent with current rights-
114. See Agre, supra note 7, at 6,35; Chaum, supra note 77; Chaum, supra note 74; Roger
Clarke, Identified, Anonymous and Pseudonymous Transactions: The Spectrum of Choice (1999)
(unpublished paper) <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/UIPP99.html> see also
BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, SECOND EDITION: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND
SOURCE CODE IN C 112-14 (2d ed. 1996) (blind signatures); id. at 125-27 (secure voting); id. at
139-45 (digital cash).
115. See Chaum, supra note 74.
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management technology'l 6 to build structures under which consumers inter-
act with content owners anonymously or pseudonymously, without sacrific-
ing content owners' ability to enforce contractual restrictions.l17
This approach would address the privacy issues raised earlier in this arti-
cle, by making the aggregation of a user's information across unrelated
transactions impossible. It would not make it impossible for a content pro-
vider to discriminate among users, but it would make that process more open
and public. Because the content provider would not know any information
about the user that the user did not provide, it could discriminate on the basis
of a particular characteristic only after expressly asking the user to provide
credentials relating to that characteristic. Content providers would be reluc-
tant to seek information where such requests would be unpopular in the mar-
ketplace or the forum of public opinion.
I do not mean to suggest that verification systems protecting user privacy
would be the first choice of content providers. For the reasons set out earlier
in this paper, content providers may find such systems significantly less
profitable, and hence less desirable, than those that give them access to a
greater range of user information. However, the feasibility of privacy-
friendly systems means that from the perspective of social policy, building
trusted systems around common identifiers is not merely undesirable; it is
unnecessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technologies involving the assignment and use of global user I)Ds, en-
forced through hardware-based user identification such as Intel's Processor
Serial Number, could give providers of information goods extensive new
capabilities. Such technologies provide an easy and straightforward way for
publishers to verify the authenticity of messages claiming authorization to
receive digital works, giving them greater ability to limit availability of their
works to folks who meet certain criteria. These technologies, though, will
have other consequences as well. The most obvious relate to privacy:
Trusted systems relying on common identifiers, and in particular systems
116. See, e.g., note 12 supra (citing sources that discuss trusted systems); R. MARTIN
ROSCHEISEN, A NETWORK-CENTRIC DESIGN FOR RELATIONSHIP-BASED RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
(1997) (Ph.D. dissertation) <http://pcd.stanford.edu-roscheis/dissertation.pdf (examining tech-
niques for articulating and enforcing boundaries of control on the Internet, while enabling collabo-
ration and sharing in a peer-to-peer environment).
117. Indeed, technologists are now building a variety of services that could offer such pseu-
donymity. See Declan McCullagh, A New ID-Less ID System, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 22, 2000)
<http:lwww.wired.conlnews/polities/0,1283,34477,00.html>; Chris Oakes, Pseudonymity Now,
WIRED NEWS (Jan. 21, 2000) <httpJ/wvw.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,33805,00.html>;
David Pescovitz, Undercover Agents, STANDARD (Jai. 3, 2000) <http://vA,,,i.thestandard.coniarticle/
display/0,1 151,8482,00.html>.
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built around the PSN, threaten to sharply lessen anonymity and informational
privacy on the Internet. They raise the prospect that a much larger propor-
tion of ordinary transactions will require consumers to present unique identi-
fication numbers digitally linked to a wide range of personally identifiable
information. They are well-suited to being used across the board by a large
number of unrelated information collectors, increasing the ease with which a
wide range of information about a person can be aggregated into a single
overall dossier.
Moreover, the combination of trusted-systems technology, which allows
publishers to ensure that speech released to Bob does not make its way via
sharing or secondary markets to Alice, and the privacy impacts of allowing
publishers to collect extensive individualized information on consumers will
likely affect the economics and politics of speech markets. It may sharply
enhance producers' ability to discriminate among individual consumers, on
price and other grounds, in connection with the sale and marketing of infor-
mation goods. Some commentators suggest that this concentration of control
is a good thing; the price discrimination it enables, they argue, will broaden
distribution of information goods. Yet the benefits of such a system are
clouded; any increase in distribution due to price discrimination comes at the
cost of shutting down distribution that comes, in today's less-controlled sys-
tem, through sharing or secondary markets. It will likely be accompanied by
increased media concentration and a self-reinforcing cycle of commercial
pressure on individual privacy.
It is important to remember, finally, that publishers can get the benefits
of trusted systems without these socially undesirable consequences. Build-
ing trusted systems around common identifiers, in other words, is gratuitous.
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